The Cradle of Chaos: Metamorphosis of Chinese Elite, 1850s-1900s
After an extended period of political weakening, China's Qing Empire collapsed in 1911, putting an end to a monarchical system that had existed for several thousand years. Chinese society faced a new problem of building up a modern state, but in the resulting disruption of central authority, contradictions between different political groups sharpened, and they failed to reach a consensus.
With the traditional political order non-existent and a new one not yet in being, military groups moved to the forefront. For all that, although they were relatively organized and effective forces, they nevertheless failed to achieve unity and provide a leader who could become a feasible head of a state. Indeed, the power of regional warlords bloomed in full, reaching its peak during 1916-28, when centrifugal forces split China into disparate fiefdoms. The fragmentation of China largely defined the course of events in this country through all 20 century, so explaining the origins of the warlord era should be central to any understanding of modern Chinese history.
There is a growing number of works in Chinese, English, and Russian, Republican warlords were the direct heirs of nineteenth-century regional leaders.
In the non-military-governor school, Jerome Ch'en, Cui Yunwu (Cui 1998: 196-97 ), Edward McCord (McCord 1993: 24-30) , and Mary Wright (Wright 1967: 199) deny the existence of this linkage, explaining the chaos -as Ch'en (Ch'en 1969: 23) puts it-by the 'removal of imperial rule and hence of the Confucian legal and political restrain'; Republican warlords were the brood of the specific crisis of the early twentieth century. Yet odd it is that neighboring Russia which was much more ethnically diverse than China and had almost identical history of military cliques-survived the overthrow of its monarchy in the 1917 February revolution and preserved its unity for almost eight months until the October revolution, while in China, within six weeks of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, all of I believe that three prerequisites gave rise to the bloom of warlordism.
Firstly, Chinese emperors, starting from the Song dynasty enforced an elaborate system of checks and balances which was meant to sustain combat effectiveness and limit the power of certain military commanders. Secondly, while the provincial governors were literati without military backgrounds, the system could function effectively, but in the wake of rebellions like the Taiping, such governors obtained military experience, and they, along with army officers who increasingly rose to governorship, could now finance and thus control troops which, in substance, they owned privately. Thirdly, when the throne failed to put down the Taiping Rebellion of the 1860s, local army elites rose to this challenge. By doing this they gained political power and hastened the very process which militarized Chinese society and eventually resulted in the bloom of warlordism after the fall of Qing. By then local armies consisted of the soldiers who, with the centralized funding non-existent, had to rely for the sake of their own survival on the generosity of their direct commanders who could raise funds locally, thus becoming local feudal lords.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Qing Empire found itself in a grip of systematic crisis. This crisis affected all spheres of life, making no exception for the armed forces. By the mid-nineteenth century, Chine were facing a number of serious internal and external challenges, raising doubts about its survival and forcing a search for measures that could buttress the country's security and its 3 It was the time, when China's army gave up its role of a 'purely supporting tool' and became a 'ruling power', see (Menshikov & Nepomnin 1999: 208) ; McCord also claims that the research of the emergence of warlordism is crucial for understanding of military-civil relations in contemporary China, see (McCord 1993: 2) . defense potential. Traditional China could boast two crucial peculiarities: firstly the undersized role of the military and its all-around reliance on civil officials. A historical heritage of four thousand years dictated relations between military and civil officials (Xu 2009: 88) . Confucius himself in the Analects pointed out the headship of the civil above the military. 4 Confucian virtues did not include military exploits; so there in no wonder why Confucians held warriors in neglect.
Soldiery lacked popularity, as expressed in the proverb, "Good iron is not made into nails, good men are not made into soldiers." 5 As a result, the authorities manned by civil officials constantly did their best to impose strict control over the army. Among the evidence of the first such attempts one can mention so-called "tiger tallies" (hufu), used from the Warring States period through the Eastern
Han and beyond. Rulers at the capital provided local military commander with a half of a pair of matching tallies and kept the other half; when the time came for action, rulers sent their half to the locality, thus authorizing the commander's action. 6 All Chinese emperors especially during the Song, did their best in imposing strict control over the armed forces. 7 The constitutive essence of the The organizational framework of the army during Qing is a vivid example illustrating Chinese traditional policy of creating a system of checks and balances. 4 See, for example, Lunyu, Chapter 12, verse 7. 5 'Hao nan bu dang bing, hao tie bu da ding' (Zhukov 1988: 14) . 6 The contents of the Xinqi tally clearly demonstrate that even the commanders of relatively small detachments required special permission for action: 'Whenever one is to levy troops and equip them with armor if more than fifty soldiers are used one must match the king's tally, only then shall one undertake it.' (Falkenhausen 2005: 86) . 7 The first emperor of Song dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin, took special precautions to ensure that the army could not threaten the throne. The Northern Song's Military Council operated under a chancellor, who had no control over the imperial army. The imperial army was divided among three marshals, each independently responsible to the Emperor (Xu 2009: 96-97) In order to eliminate all possible threats to the throne, Qing emperors intentionally avoided the creation of a unified national army. Instead they chose to split it into two halves. (Zarrow 2005: 90) . One half was the Eight Banners Army (Baqibing), which in its turn consisted of eight Manchu, eight Mongol, and eight Chinese corps. These corps-the court's main support-were posted in Manchuria, along the empire's northern border, and at strategic points throughout the provinces.
The other half, the Green Standard Army (Lϋyingbing), was manned mostly by ethnic Han soldiers. They were scattered over thousands of outposts all over the empire. Thus its key feature was extreme fragmentation. In general, the Green
Standard Army was rather a great constabulary or gendarmerie force than a combat army (Powell 1955: 13) . The nineteenth century witnessed gradual degradation of the Chinese army.
In the Eight Banners, significant numbers of bannermen turned into beggars. The throne provided bannermen with special grants of land, meanwhile denying them the right to seek employment outside the service. Since in due course the number of bannermen dependents grew, these grants of land could not any longer secure them adequate support. The Green Standard Army was in equally poor shape.
Officers squander funds, and the soldiers were so slack in terms of discipline that they did not differ much from bandits (Gittings 1969: 191-92 The system of financial support comprised another important feature of these armies. On one hand, the central financial system was static and couldn't respond to either long-term change or sudden emergencies. On the other hand the throne chose to preserve Green Standard and Banner troops. Thus new armies manned by militia forces became an additional financial load o state budget. They did not fit into the established military system and thus "had no prearranged funding" (Powell 1955: 25) . In this shortage or even total absence of financial support from the central government, Zeng Guofan had little option but to rely on the Yangtze provinces-Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui-creating his own independent financial organization. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the throne permitted him to use local sources to fund the army, as well as sanctioned sales of degrees, titles, and even offices. Still it is essential to point out that these funds were all local (Liu 1978: 410) . 12 Furthermore, there is little doubt that 11 Li Hongzhang benefited from the fact that his father Li Wen'an had been a classmate of Zeng Guofan. Li Wen'an and Zeng Guofan together took part in the top examination of 1838. In 1859, Li Hongzhang joined Zeng Guofan staff, became his principal secretary and drafted his correspondence (Fairbank 1986: 107) . 12 In the beginning of 1854 in attempt to exploit this source of income, Zeng asked to provide him with 4,000 blank certificates (kongbai zhizhao). He was planning to use them for fundraising in Hunan, Jiangxi, and Sichuan, with one half of blank certificates for official ranks (zhixian) and another half for imperial academy students (jiansheng), see (Porter 1972: 103) . 13 Out of 1,300 officers with the rank of brigadier and higher who made their way to prominence in 1912-28, only 370-400 had a professional military education or were holders of traditional degrees and thus could be called 'educated warlords'. The rest -about 70 percent of a total were mainly illiterate or semi-literate people from extremely humble origins (Ch'en, 1968: 568). 14 The heads of provincial administration bore the full load of responsibility for both civil and military affairs within their jurisdictions, but they could hardly fulfill their duty as military commanders. As a result of constant rotations officials always found themselves in charge of unfamiliar bodies of troops, 'whose officers were strangers to them, and with those training and selection they had nothing to do'... The whole system was intentionally designed 'to keep provincial official well apart from the management of the troops he was charged with commanding in time of military emergency.' (Kuhn 1970: 122-23) .
half based their careers on militia leadership (Powell 1955: 33) . Now a fair quantity of governors-general and governors could boast of many vivid distinctions from their pre-rebellion colleagues. Firstly -now they had a record as effective commanders of militia battalions to add to their literati careers; secondly -had obtained military experience, thirdly -knew how to handle soldiers, and the lastly -they had troops personally loyal to them through personal control of recruitment, appointments, promotions, and funding.
The non-military-governor school of prevailing historiography rests on four main arguments. Firstly, they claim that provincial authorities lacked financial independence, and the court gathered a large portion of local revenues from a new provincial tax on imports and articles in transit (lijin), by demanding special remittances for central expenses (McCord 1993: 27) . Provincial governors, aside from emergencies, were allowed to spend tax revenue on items preliminary approved by central authorities, and their budget was under strict central control (Kamachi 2005: 9) . And yet, practice fell far short of this ideal. Aside from lijin, local authorities had at disposal at least three further sources of income. First, were so-called hidden lands or fields (yintian or heidi). Their area was growing due to non-disclosure during the registration of tax rolls with the Board of Revenue, and mistakes during conversion of local mu (a sixth of an acre) into standard fiscal mu (Feuerwerker 1980: 10) . In 1887, the total area of such hidden fields reached 418 million mu, or a third of all cultivable land (Nepomnin 1980: 26) . Secondly, the first decade of twentieth century was a marked by the significant growth of additional taxes (jiashui) and compulsory donations (juanshu) collected locally. Their extent considerably exceeded the national land and head taxes (diding) (Ibid., 110-11). Thirdly, the introduction in 1889 of the new monetary system gave local authorities a brilliant opportunity to overcharge taxes during money conversion; the growing numbers of villagers paid taxes using fens and yuans, while officials assessed taxes in old copper cash and taels (Wang 1973: 116-17) . Governors thereby easily managed to accumulate huge assets in provincial coffers. J.K. Fairbank believes that the local authorities sent to the capital not more than a third of what they really collected (Fairbank 1998: 248) . Such local taxes were available to the state only in nominal terms -very much the same as the regional armies they fed. In reality such state of affairs possessed such a degree of autonomy that they did not simply disregard imperial edicts but also challenged their competence. 16 A decade later when the Qing empire fell, fifteen provinces failed to recognize Beijing as the center of the 15 Apart from the battalion level (39 commanders with literati background against 52 with military), on all other levels the numbers of commanders with literati backgrounds exceeded those with military backgrounds; altogether, there were 100 commanders with literati background against 75 with military, see (Luo 1939: 64) . 16 Some governors-general like Zhang Zhidong at Wuchang, Liu Kunyi at Nanjing, Li Hongzhang at Canton, etc., immediately agreed to ignore Peking's declaration of war against the foreign powers, issued on 21 June 1900. They claimed that it was a luanming, an illegitimate decree issued without the emperor's proper authorization (Fairbank 1998: 231 armies were formed as a counterweight to each other, which agreed with the traditional Chinese policy of checks and balances. Self-Strengthening Army accepted recruits that were to be sixteen-twenty years old and originate from peasant families in areas near Nanking, so that their references could be checked.
Before the admission, the recruits had to undergo through a medical examination, conducted by a foreign doctor. Apart for that village heads, neighbors, and clan had to vouch for those who expressed desire to serve in the Self-Strengthening
Army. Historian Hatano Yoshihiro expresses reasonable doubts that every recruit underwent through 'all the stages of the selection process', but Viceroy Zhang Zhidong's insistence on the protocols is nonetheless revealing (Hatano 1968: 371 These armies from the very first day of their existence could boast of a distinctive feature: their organization was tailored according to the German pattern, which was a great step forward even in comparison with the most progressive among their predecessors, the Huai Army, which had a plain pyramidal structure. 17 Unlike Taiping era 'private armies', they adopted a complex branched structure, with functional divisions into infantry, cavalry, and artillery, along with an engineering corps and other technical components, Harbor and global war.
